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Abstract
The coordinated pursuit of risk investments at the heart of the 
World Bank Group’s strategy for the mining sector of reforming 
countries is the subject of this contribution. The crux of this paper 
is to investigate how the multi-front presence of the International 
Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency, and the World Bank, has been transforming the roles, 
responsibilities and legitimacy of the stakeholders involved in 
mining activities. It is argued that beyond the newly defined 
social-development narrative championed by each member of the 
Group, the actual safeguards and policies being carried out in the 
mining sector may be better understood as tools to circumscribe 
the risks faced by the Industry, rather than by local populations. 
This further stresses the particular contradictions inherent to the 
concerted actions of on the one hand, the World Bank itself, which 
has been especially active in promoting new mining regimes in 
country clients, and on the other hand, IFC and MIGA, which 
have been benefiting from such regimes by engaging in for-profit 
activities in the very sector.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2008, the soaring of metal prices came to a screeching halt, 
thus gravely affecting mineral dependant countries. Beyond the issue of 
the sharp decline in prices however, the global recession’s main challenge 
has been the lack of credit available for the industry. Consequently, the 
production has been forced to slow down, mines have closed and explora-
tion programs have been put on hold. Interestingly however, Robert Zoel-
lick, the president of the World Bank, announced that amidst the current 
economic crisis, the extractive resources industry more than ever, would 
have to benefit the poor (Zoellick, 2009). In light of the current credit crisis 
and the deceleration of global mining activities, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) have been sent to the rescue. The Bank affiliates’ ‘counter-cycle 
role’ is seen as pivotal in time of crisis, as it entices Foreign Direct Invest-
ments (FDI) where investors would have otherwise been reluctant to in-
vest in.
The coordinated pursuit of ‘risk’ investments at the heart of the World 
Bank Group’s strategy is the subject of this contribution. While the World 
Bank is involved in an historical process of compelling governments to re-
vise their national laws, policies and institutions in order to attract invest-
ments, IFC and MIGA are partnering with the private sector, providing in-
vestments and insurance for mining endeavours in the newly reformed 
countries. Such efforts in recent years have been met with severe criticism 
linked to the significant social and environmental costs of mining activi-
ties, not withstanding the political instability, corruption and violent con-
flicts such activities have often brought forth. As a result, the World Bank 
Group (WBG) has embraced a ‘social-development narrative’ which em-
phasises transparency and governance, local communities involvement in 
participatory schemes and overall, pro-poor economic growth in a sustain-
able perspective. The crux of this paper is to investigate how such multi-
front presence of the different members of the WBG has been transform-
ing the roles, responsibilities and legitimacy of the stakeholders involved 
in mining activities. It is argued that beyond a newly define social-devel-
opment narrative, the safeguards and policies being carried out in the 
mining sector may be better understood as a tool to circumscribe the risks 
faced by the Industry, rather than by local populations. Such argument 
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further stresses the particular contradictions inherent to the concerted ac-
tions of on the one hand, the World Bank itself, which has been especially 
active in promoting new mining regimes in country clients and therefore 
has been partly credited for the mining boom of the last decade, and on the 
other hand, IFC and MIGA, which have been profiting from such regimes 
by engaging in for-profit activities in the very sector. 
This paper is divided into three parts. The first section briefly de-
scribes the roles and functions of MIGA and IFC in the mining sector of 
reforming countries, with a particular emphasis on recent trends. In light 
of their role as catalysts for risk investments in the industry, the second 
section addresses MIGA and IFC’s questionable legacy in the sector. It will 
further be observed that as a result of such mitigated legacy, notably in re-
lation to environmental and social safeguards, the WBG has recently 
transformed its image by adopting a ‘social-development narrative’. How-
ever, it will be argued that the new safeguards and policies promoted un-
der the social-development narrative umbrella are de facto relegating the 
greater responsibility of environmental and social protection upon the 
shoulders of the Industry. In the final section of this contribution, this 
faith on the ability – and willingness – of the private sector to self-regu-
late will be questioned. It will therefore be argued that the coordinated ef-
forts of the WBG are particularly telling of a specific framework which se-
riously impedes mineral-rich reforming countries to explore and adopt 
alternative economic strategies in the sector, which ultimately may have 
proven to be more conductive to poverty reduction.
I.  IFC, MIGA AND THE PURSUIT OF RISK INVESTMENTS 
While the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
and the International Development Association (IDA) work solely with 
governments1), the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multi-
lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provide loans to private cor-
porations with projects in emerging markets. The coordinating mecha-
nisms between the Bank and its affiliates are focused on each member’s 
comparative advantage. As such, the Bank is officially responsible for 
country policy dialogue and tends to focus on broader structural and social 
 1) 　Hereafter IBRD and IDA are referred to as ‘the World Bank’ or ‘the Bank’.
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issues, including sector policy reform and institutional capacity building. 
IFC focuses on attracting private sector investment, particularly in coun-
tries where its projects are expected to catalyse new investments, while 
MIGA specialises in providing political risk guarantees (World Bank, 
2005: 3). In this section, the roles of IFC and MIGA will respectively be de-
fined. A specific emphasis will be put on their unique ability to attract 
‘risk’ investments, notably in the mining sector.
Established in 1956, IFC is the private sector lending arm of the 
WBG. It is a for-profit organisation which aims to support the growth of 
the private sector in developing countries. It does so primarily by financ-
ing private sector investment, mobilising capital in the international fi-
nancial markets, and providing advisory services to businesses and gov-
ernments (IFC, 2009d). With its $1.5 billion net income in the 2008 fiscal 
year (IFC, 2008: 12), IFC is the largest multilateral financial institution 
investing in private enterprises in emerging markets. The organisation 
disbursed close to $11 billion in 2007, almost one third that of the entire 
WBG (Bretton Woods Project, 2008).
MIGA’s central mission is to promote FDI in developing countries. Its 
main activities are to insure FDI against the risks of expropriation, war, 
civil disturbance, terrorism, and sabotage; currency inconvertibility and 
transfer restrictions; as well as breach of contract (MIGA, 2009c: 1). Since 
its inception in 1988, MIGA has issued nearly 900 guarantees worth more 
than $17.4 billion for projects in 96 developing countries (MIGA, 2009a). 
In addition to providing political risk insurance, the Agency also offers 
technical assistance such as capacity building and advisory services to 
help countries attract FDI, as well as dispute mediation services2) in order 
to reduce future obstacles to investment. 
Closely complimenting the Bank’s own activities in the sector, IFC 
and MIGA have played a significant role over time in the mining sector of 
reforming countries. Today, IFC dedicates about six percent of its total 
lending portfolio to the extractive industry3) (World Bank, 2005: 2). Bill 
Bulmer, the head of Mining IFC, estimated that the Corporation’s mining 
portfolio is worth about $840 million (Mining Journal, 2009). MIGA’s ac-
tivities in the mining industry represent four percent of its outstanding 
 2)  MIGA also provides dispute mediation services and works with the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, which operates through conciliation or arbitration. 
 3)  Define as oil, gas, and mining production.
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guarantee portfolio in 2008. This share remains nonetheless quite sub-
stantial as the Agency’s mining portfolio currently stands at $269 million 
(MIGA, 2009c: 3). 
However, MIGA and IFC’s influence in the extractive industry ex-
tends far beyond the mere numbers of their respective portfolios. What is 
indeed crucial to note is that the extent of the Bank’s affiliates influence 
over the mining industry is better defined by their respective ability to act 
as catalysts for private sector investments. For example, since its inception 
MIGA has issued a total of $11billion in coverage while it further facilitat-
ed an estimated $47 billion of FDI (Bray, 2003: 324). It has also been par-
ticularly active in promoting new mining ventures in Africa, for example, 
by sponsoring investment conferences (Bray, 2003: 325). 
MIGA and IFC’s significant influence further extends to their ability 
to entice private investments in particularly risk countries, as well as in 
risk sectors. Foreign investors often hesitate to invest in countries with 
weak governance – notably countries where the lack of transparency, ade-
quate laws, financial capacity and regulations may seriously impede min-
ing projects. 
Over the years, MIGA has designed political risk insurance products 
specifically to target mining-related investors, such as the revocation of 
leases or concessions, tariff, regulatory, and credit risks arising from 
breach of government contracts, and disputes related to take-off agree-
ments, and exploitation rights (MIGA, 2009c: 1). As such, MIGA’s power to 
galvanise investments in risk countries is overwhelming, notably in the 
extractive industry which is specifically defined as a high-risk sector. The 
WBG’s independent evaluation units, which published an extensive study 
of the extractive industries and their impact on sustainable development, 
observed that most of MIGA’s projects were in countries: ‘where interna-
tional private investors had been reluctant to make large investments be-
cause of limited experience with new governments or difficulties faced by 
previous investments in that country or sector’ (World Bank, 2005: 6). The 
report further underlines that in these instances, MIGA’s role was ‘signifi-
cant in enabling investment flows into the mining sector’ (2005: 6).
In a way, MIGA’s very raison d’être is precisely to facilitate invest-
ments in high-risk, low-income countries – such as in Africa and conflict-
affected areas (MIGA, 2009a). It has indeed been closely involved in moti-
vating private sector investments in conflict-affected countries, which is 
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an ‘operational priority for the agency’, states MIGA (2009a). As the ‘world 
leader’ (MIGA, 2009a) in assessing and managing political risks, it has in-
deed become a key player in enticing investors to transcend their weari-
ness of potential risks in investing in such climates.
Similarly, IFC’s own Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) found that 
the organisation played a catalysing role in the extractive industry, often 
being the first private investor in the sector (OEG, 2005: 115). In fact, IFC’
s dedication to stimulate investment in ‘risk’ projects or countries is en-
shrined in its article of agreement, which underlines that the Corporation 
shall adopt a role of catalyst by investing only in projects for which suffi-
cient private capital is not available on reasonable terms4). 
II.  THE WBG AND THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL-DEVELOPMENT NARRATIVE
The Extractive Industries Review (EIR), which was established in 
2003 to evaluate the WBG’s involvement in extractive industries, found 
that while extractive industries can yield benefits for countries, data sug-
gests that developing countries with few natural resources grew two to 
three times faster than resource-rich countries from 1960 to 2000 (EIR, 
2003: 12). The Review further observed that the majority of the 45 coun-
tries that did not manage to sustain economic growth during that time 
also experienced violent conflict and civil strife in the 1990s (2003: 12). 
The multiplication of socio-environmental problems linked to extractive 
activities, not withstanding the ambiguous economic benefits of the indus-
try, led to highly critical literature suggesting that the actual benefits of 
the mining industry may have been overstated. The underlying idea of the 
‘resource curse’ suggests that an abundance of natural resources creates 
political and economic distortions, thus increasing the likelihood that 
countries will experience negative development outcomes (Rosser 2006: 7), 
a reality that is now widely acknowledged by all stakeholders in the in-
dustry5). The WBG is no exception: ‘resource-rich countries are indeed 
more likely to have problems achieving important development goals’, 
states the Bank in a recent evaluation of its experience in the extractive 
 4)  Available at http://ifcln1.ifc.org/ifcext/about.nsf/Content/IFC_Origins (accessed October 10, 
2009).
 5)  See Auty (1993), Sachs and Warner (1995). For a thorough critical literature review on the 
subject see Rosser (2006).
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sector (OEG, 2005: 120). 
This section provides an overview of the social and environmental is-
sues associated with the mining industry and the particular experiences of 
IFC and MIGA. The second part of this section suggests that the WBG has 
recently significantly transformed its image by adopting what is here re-
ferred to as a ‘social-development narrative’. However, it will be noted that 
the new safeguards and policies promoted under the social-development 
narrative umbrella are de facto relegating the greater responsibility of en-
vironmental and social protection upon the shoulders of the Industry. 
a) Managing ‘Externalities’: MIGA and IFC’s Legacy in the Mining Sector
Mining in itself has been acknowledged to be one of the most environmen-
tally disruptive activities that can be undertaken by business (Bebbington 
et al., 2009: 893). From an environmental standpoint, the possible impacts 
of large-scale mining projects are overwhelming. They notably include: the 
destruction of natural habitats as a result of the dumping of tailings and 
discharges; soil degradation and acid mine drainage; riverbed pollution; 
chemical soil contamination; air emissions (dust, pollutants); the use of 
scarce water and energy resources; workers handling chemical products; 
and the different risks associated with exposure to toxic substances (Be-
leme, 2008: 121). To put it simply, the creation of one single gold ring re-
quires miners to dig up more than 30 tons of rock – which then need to be 
sprinkled with cyanide (Johnson and Perlez, 2005). The mining industry is 
all the more problematic as its environmental implications extend well be-
yond the duration of the mine’s activity and as such, mine closure is a 
highly sensitive issue. In a critical analysis of the WBG’s activities in the 
gold mining sector, a coalition of international Non-Governmental Organi-
sation (NGOs) gave a compelling depiction of the potential long-term dam-
ages of mining activities: 
[…] the typical modern gold mine […] often irreversibly alter land-
scapes, displace communities, contaminate drinking water, harm 
workers, and destroy pristine ecosystems or farm lands. Pollution 
caused by mining can last for thousands of years, destroying forever 
land and water resources that local communities depend on for their 
livelihoods (BIC et al., 2006: 2).
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While the 1990s witnessed a greater emphasis on environmental issues, 
the social and human rights dimensions of mining activities have started 
getting more attention only in recent years. However, notes Szablowski: ‘In 
practice, responsibilities for social impacts are often regarded rather loose-
ly by both mining enterprises and governments. Despite its potential, so-
cial impact assessment remains the “orphan of the assessment process”’ 
(2007: 51). Nevertheless, it is now widely understood that communities liv-
ing in the vicinity of a mining site often bear an overwhelming share of 
the negative impacts of the extractive industry. Building on the case of the 
Malian mining sector, Belem found that such projects tend to exacerbate 
income disparities and directly affect the local community through: popu-
lation displacement; increased migration of workers into the project zone; 
price inflation resulting from this migration; the abandonment of agricul-
tural activities; expropriation of fertile land to satisfy the mine’s require-
ments; and increased public health problems (2009: 122). Such inherent 
social problems brought forth by the mining industry are often exacerbat-
ed in countries where conflicts have already erupted and where corruption 
is rampant. As observed in the EIR:
In a number of countries, extractive industries have been linked to 
human rights abuses and civil conflict. Such abuses have been docu-
mented, for example, in cases where the army has been called in to 
guard extractive industries projects. Indigenous peoples and local 
communities may be forced off their lands to make way for projects, 
and those protesting the development may be locked up or physically 
harmed. The large economic rents generated by extractive industries 
may help provoke or prolong civil conflict (EIR, 2003: 6).
The environmental, social and human rights costs of mining activities, es-
pecially in already fragile and conflict-affected countries, raise important 
concerns about the WBG’s specific strategy adopted in order to entice in-
vestments in the sector. MIGA and IFC have repeatedly stated that it is 
precisely in light of these particular risks that they should remain in-
volved in such industry. Both organisations argue that they help bring eco-
nomic growth where it is most urgently needed: ‘In places where the poor 
might otherwise be left behind, we play a catalytic role’, states IFC (2008: 
33). Beyond their official mission to tackle poverty however, the Bank affil-
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iates repeatedly stated that they bring to the sector safeguard policies and 
guidelines that ‘improve projects beyond compliance’ (OEG, 2005: 118). 
However, the particular track record of the Bank’s affiliates in the in-
dustry has been severely tarnished over the years. Amongst the better-
known cases is the incident at the Yanacocha mine, a Peruvian open pit 
gold mine – which is incidentally so large that it can be seen from outer 
space6). A truck from the mine, which is one of the most profitable invest-
ments in the entire IFC portfolio (Bebbington et al., 2008: 896), spilled 150 
kilograms of mercury on a road. The incident, which took place in 2000, re-
portedly brought more than 1,000 people to state that they were affected 
by the spill (BIC et al., 2006: 3). On another continent, in May 1998, the 
Kumtor gold mine in Kyrgyztan, which is financed and insured by IFC 
and MIGA, released nearly two tons of sodium cyanide into the Barskoon 
river (EIR, 2003: 26), leaving several people dead and hundreds seeking 
medical treatment (BIC et al., 2006: 4). In line with such trends, the con-
troversial Freeport company, the operator of a copper and gold mine in 
New Guinea which was insured by MIGA, dumped 120,000 tonnes of toxic 
mining waste into a local river (BIC et al., 2006: 4)7).
The Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman8) (CAO) concluded in 2002, that 
MIGA’s attention to social issues was ‘weaker than its coverage of environ-
mental aspects’ (CAO 2002: iv). It further observed that the Agency had 
failed to flag early on in its review process a number of potential social im-
pacts that might adversely influence a project’s outcomes9) (2002: iv). The 
WBG’s own evaluation units critiqued the Agency in 2005 for its lack of a 
‘proactive approach with its clients throughout its involvement with the 
projects to add value by improving their environmental and social impacts’ 
(World Bank, 2005: 8).
It is in light of the extent of the social and environmental problems 
linked to the extractive industry that James D. Wolfensohn – the World 
Bank president at the time –ordered two-year moratorium on the WBG’s  
 6) According to Bury (2005), quoted by Bebbington et al. (2008: 894).
 7)  For further analysis and case studies on the social and environmental legacy of the WBG, 
see notably BIC et al. (2006), Campbell (2004; 2009), Bury (2005), Goldman (2005).
 8)  The CAO was created in 1999 to improve the environmental and social performance of the 
IFC and MIGA, and to address complaints of people affected by its projects.
 9)  In half of MIGA’s projects reviewed by the CAO. The CAO further found that: ‘Potential so-
cial issues that were not initially flagged were almost never picked up later in MIGA’s re-
view process’ (2002: iv).
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mining investments and a review of its involvement in the industry. While 
the EIR, which emerged from this process, did conclude that there was 
still a role for the WBG in the sector, it however underlined that such role 
should be strictly limited to one of contributing to sustainable develop-
ment10): ‘Extractive industry projects considered for World Bank Group 
support should be evaluated to ensure that their expected benefits espe-
cially for the poor are sufficiently higher than their estimated costs, in-
cluding environmental and social costs’ (EIR, 2003: 4). 
In its official response to the independent evaluation, the Bank de-
clared: ‘Our future investments in extractive industries will be selective, 
with greater focus on the needs of poor people, and a stronger emphasis on 
good governance and on promoting environmentally and socially sustaina-
ble development’ (World Bank, 2004: iii). The Bank further argued that it 
had already started implementing many of the EIR’s recommendations, 
including: initiatives on gas-flaring reduction, carbon-emissions trading, 
revenue transparency, help for small-scale mining operations, and in-
creased support for biodiversity (World Bank, 2004: iii). It is a fact that by 
the end of the 1990s, the Bank had substituted its conventional policy rec-
ommendation framework for one that promoted far stricter environmental 
and social clauses. 
While the Bank does today acknowledge that extractive industries 
may ‘aggravate or cause serious environmental, health, and social prob-
lems, including conflict and war’ (World Bank, 2005: 1), it remains ada-
mant that such negative impacts are not inevitable. It thus proposed a so-
cial-development narrative in order to maximise the contribution of 
mining activities to development. The motivations and the content of this 
emergent narrative are analysed in detail in the following section.
b) The Rise of the Social-Development Narrative
The end of the 1990s witnessed an important shift in the World Bank’s 
narrative as a whole. During the Wolfensohn’s presidency (1995-2005), the 
Bank indeed shifted from its austere narrative centred on the blind pur-
suit of economic growth to a more ‘comprehensive’ way of doing business11). 
Such shift was notably influenced by the fact that as he took his position 
 10)  For a thorough analysis of the EIR and the WBG’s following response, see Campbell (2009).
 11)  See James D. Wolfensohn’s ‘A proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework: a 
Discussion Draft’ (1999).
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in 1995, Wolfensohn was inheriting an arrogant institution which was 
drawing fire from all sides of the spectrum12). Amongst the numerous ver-
bal critics, the international campaign Fifty Years is Enough did a lot to 
tarnish the institution’s already unsteady reputation. The environmental 
impact of Bank financed mega-projects (see Goldman, 2005), the systemat-
ic failure to consult local stakeholders, and the overall lack of transparen-
cy of the institution, were some elements of the shaky legacy of Wolfen-
sohn’s predecessors – Lewis Preston and Barber Conable. ‘Our dream is a 
world free of poverty’, Wolfensohn declared, and in so doing, he committed 
the institution, at least discursively, to addressing the social aspects of 
poverty and to forging closer partnerships with other actors in develop-
ment, including those within civil society13). In the remaining of this con-
tribution, this shift in the Bank’s narrative is referred to as a ‘social-devel-
opment agenda’. It encompasses the unwavering emphasis on ‘poverty 
reduction’ as a central objective of all the Bank’s actions, as well as an 
overwhelming emphasis on social concepts such as civil society participa-
tion, environmental protection and empowerment of local entities.
Undoubtedly influenced by its sombre legacy in the sector, as well as 
by the harsh evaluation of the EIR, the Bank’s new social-development 
narrative has become deeply embedded in its activities in the extractive 
sector: ‘We help people work, prosper, and live better and longer lives’, 
states IFC (2009c). Similarly, MIGA states that it promotes FDI ‘to help 
support economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve people’s lives’ 
(MIGA, 2009b). Both MIGA and IFC claim that they stimulate the private 
sector in reforming countries in order to achieve the Bank’s overarching 
mission to fight poverty. In terms of social and environmental standards, 
both affiliates’ narratives emphasise environmental sustainability of min-
ing operations, while ensuring that mining activities contain a social com-
ponent to benefit local communities (IFC, 2007b; MIGA, 2009a). 
MIGA has its own environmental assessment policy since 1999. How-
ever, it approved new social, environmental and disclosure policies in 
2006, which were inspired by IFC’s own standards. Today, MIGA has 
mechanisms in place to officially evaluate the potential environmental and 
social risks and impacts of its projects. The Agency underlines that such 
 12) On the subject, see Mallaby (2004).
 13)  For a critical historical review of the international and internal pressures that pushed the 
Bank under the Wolfensohn presidency to adopt a new aid framework, see Hatcher (2006).
RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS68 【Vol. 8
an evaluation helps address the identified adverse environmental and so-
cial impacts by improving the project planning and design throughout the 
implementation of a project (MIGA, 2009c: 2). As stated by MIGA, the so-
cial impact assessments ‘examine a project’s impacts on peoples’ living 
standards, including impacts on their livelihood, and productive and cul-
tural assets’ (2009c: 2). 
Until the early 1990s, IFC followed the World Bank’s safeguard poli-
cies, guidelines, and procedures. However, the Corporation started devel-
oping its own sector-specific guidelines for areas not covered by the Bank’s 
guidelines, notably in relation to procedures for environmental review 
(1992-93)14). In 2006, no doubt as a result of the severe conclusions of the 
EIR, IFC replaced its safeguard policies with the Policies on Social and 
Environmental Sustainability and new Performance Standards. These 
new guidelines clarify what it expects from miners, says Rachel Kyte, the 
director of environment and social development and IFC (Quoted in John-
son and Perlez, 2005). 
While both organisations have taken measures to improve their envi-
ronmental and social standards, such initiatives however, have been ar-
gued to fall short of insuring that future investments would meet the Bank’
s own definition of ‘environmentally and socially sound projects’ – i.e. that 
they adequately mitigate negative social and environmental effects and, 
provide tangible and sustainable benefits for local people (OEG, 2005: 113). 
IFC and MIGA have failed to adopt some of the core recommendations of 
the EIR, notably the requirement for the free, prior and informed consent 
of project-affected people and communities. The World Bank stated that it 
would require ‘consultations’ – instead of ‘consent’ – which, bluntly ex-
plains the Bank: ‘does not mean a veto power for individuals or any group, 
but means that the Bank Group will require a process of free, prior, and in-
formed consultation with affected communities that leads to the affected 
community’s broad support for the project’ (World Bank, 2004: vi).
While the IFC’s new Policies on Social and Environmental Sustaina-
bility and Performance Standards are to be welcomed, they have already 
raised important concerns, notably in regard to the assessment methods 
that they put forth. An overwhelming issue has been the way in which as-
 14)  Following a substantial change in its review procedures and an initial adaptation of some of 
its safeguard policies in 1998, the IFC has regularly adapted its guidelines (OEG, 2005: 115).
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sessments rely on Industry-generated information. In its analysis of IFC’s 
new Policies and Standards, the Halifax Initiative Coalition concludes 
that: ‘A significant degree of leeway is permitted in their application, and 
non-compliance is tolerated as long as clients continue to improve their 
performance15)’ (2006: 1). The Social and Environmental Assessment 
(SEA)16), which notably determines the necessary improvement and/or mit-
igation measures of the Action Plan, are indeed to be written by the client 
and as such, the client has a substantial influence on the range of issues 
that will later be assessed by IFC. Furthermore, human rights issues are 
not explicitly required to be addressed by the Industry in the SEA and lo-
cal communities are not guaranteed the opportunity to review a project’s 
Action Plan before it is finalised17). Belem’s analysis of the Malian experi-
ence corroborates such conclusions. She demonstrates that in practice, ob-
serving IFC’s performance criteria has become the responsibility of compa-
nies and strikingly, that the overall information on the mining sector 
available for independent assessments originate from the mining compa-
nies themselves (2009). 
As discussed in the following section, such reliance on the ability – 
and willingness – of the private sector to self-regulate is particularly tell-
ing of the specific framework adopted, and indeed promoted, by the WBG 
in the last decades. 
III.  THE POLITICS OF THE ‘CURSE’: NEW MINING REGIMES AND 
THE SOCIAL-DEVELOPMENT NARRATIVE
Under the distinct leadership of the WBG, the current trends in the mining 
sector are to emphasise the positive social, environmental and economic im-
pacts that the sector may have on a resource-rich country if the ‘right tech-
nical framework’ is set in place. However, it is argued in this section that 
the safeguards and policies promoted in the mining sector fall short of ad-
 15)  Moreover, observes the Coalition, there is no requirement that an IFC client comply with 
the Performance Standards for the life of the project and beyond (Halifax Initiative Coali-
tion, 2006: 1). For a critical review of the new Policy and Performance standards adopted 
by the IFC, also see Reisch (2007).
 16)  The SEA defines how the client will comply with the Performance Standards in the form of 
project-specific actions and mitigation measures. IFC clients, who assess the anticipated 
impacts of their projects and identify corresponding mitigation measures, develop them.
 17) On the subject, see Halifax Initiative Coalition (2006).
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dressing the overarching political implications of the particular mining re-
gimes that has been promoted by the World Bank in the last decade. Specifi-
cally, it is argued that if analysed in light of these new mining regimes, the 
social-development narrative is better understood as a tool to circumscribe 
the risks faced by the Industry, rather than by local populations. In other 
words, the promotion of such narrative seeks to complement the void left by 
the state in the sector by attempting to minimize and channel popular con-
testation by technical means. This is examined in three steps. First, the his-
torical role of the World Bank in redefining mining regimes in reforming 
countries is analysed. In the second part, the transformation of the role of 
the state is assessed in light of the new social-development narrative. The 
final part provides a critical analysis of the contradictions between the pur-
suit of poverty reduction and the for-profit endeavours of MIGA and IFC, 
notably in light of the Bank’s parallel work on mining regimes.
a) The World Bank and the Promotion of New Mining Regimes
The first wave of liberalisation and deregulation, which took place 
throughout the 1980s under the umbrella of the structural adjustment 
programs, dramatically transformed the mining sectors of indebted coun-
tries rich with natural resources, especially on the African continent. The 
central objective of these reforms promoted by the Bank was to open the 
mining sector by enticing private investments in the industry. Accordingly, 
the wave of privatisation of mines was met with the establishment of an 
amalgam of incentives tailored for foreign investors, notably a reduction in 
the level of royalties and the abolition of certain taxes. 
However, by the early 1990s, it became clear that the promises of the 
reforms of the mining sector were not materialising. Oblivious to the de-
cline of mineral resources demand in the 1980s, the Bank’s re-assessment 
of the sector, which was notably based on the 1992 publication Strategy for 
African Mining led to what Campbell coined as the Second Generation of 
mining codes18) (2004). The new wave of reforms distinctively sought to de-
liver the mining sector to foreign direct investments. 
The underlying motivation behind this drive for FDI is linked to the 
 18)  In ‘Regulating Mining in Africa: For Whose Benefit?’ the Groupe de Recherche sur les Activ-
ités Mininères en Afrique (GRAMA) provides a detailed analysis of the pivotal role as-
sumed by the Bank in reforming mining regimes in mineral-rich countries over the last 
three decades (see Campbell 2004).
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traditional narrative on the expected benefits of such investments on eco-
nomic growth and ultimately, poverty reduction. Schools, health centres, 
clean water, power supply, roads and employment for local – often remote – 
communities, the promises of the extractive industry seemed infinite. As Af-
rica continues to attract less than one percent of global FDI (Kwaku, 2002), 
the reform of the mining sector was expected to stimulate investments and 
as such, counter the economic stagnation and obstacles linked to the lack of 
local sources of financing and of expertise of reforming countries. In such 
logic, governments are expected to highly benefit from the much-needed 
flow of taxes and royalties from the sector, while communities adjacent to 
the mining projects find employment. With it’s tales of fiscal revenues and 
foreign exchange earnings, the extractive industry often represents the 
main – if not the only – source of income for highly indebted poor countries. 
During the 1990s therefore, mineral endowed countries set out to fur-
ther transform their mining regimes in order to attract the desired ‘high 
risk’ investments. Mining in itself is described as a uniquely risky enter-
prise: it is a particularly capital-intensive industry, the period between in-
vestment and returns is often extensive, and profits are subjected to the 
whims of commodity prices, not withstanding the uncertainties of geologi-
cal exploration and reserve depletion rates19). In light of such risks, the 
Bank stipulates that countries must offer highly competitive settings to 
draw the scarcely available capital in their own mining sector. As such, the 
Bank’s strategy builds on the logic that ‘riskier places and riskier land-
owners deserve smaller shares of the wealth from resource development’ 
(Emel and Huber, 2008: 1397).
In short, by the end of the 1990s, countries were actively competing 
for the most deregulated and liberalised mining regime20). The prize 
 19)  Bray refers to the concept of ‘obsolescing bargain’ whereby extractive industries become 
‘hostages’ in host countries. This is characterised by the understanding that ‘once the com-
panies have paid for multi-million-dollar fixed assets, they cannot lightly withdraw from 
the host country’ (Bray 2003: 292). For a critic of the neoliberal conceptualisation of risk, 
see Emel and Huber (2008).
 20)  Compelling examples of the mining reforms that took place under the leadership of the 
Bank during the 1990s are notably Tanzania, Guinea, Zambia, Mali, Burkina Faso as well 
as Mozambique. All these countries have mineral codes with fiscal regimes that were de-
scribed as providing very generous incentives to investors in the mining sector. These re-
forms included: the pegging of royalty at three percent, a complete private ownership of 
mining ventures; increased quota of expatriate staff, with quotas determined by the inves-
tor among others (see Akabzaa 2004). 
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sought after was FDI. This took the form of a renewed commitment to the 
privatisation of state owned enterprises, a cut in subsidies to national 
mining industries, as well as the drastic lowering of royalty rates and cor-
porate taxes – and even the outright abolishment of several other meas-
ures such as import duties and foreign exchange rates. This dramatically 
transformed the mining sector of reforming countries in a way that had 
become highly economically and financially attractive to foreign compa-
nies. 
Not surprisingly, foreign investments in the extractive industry in-
creased exponentially during the mid-1990s onward. It is estimated that 
under the distinct leadership of the World Bank, no less than 100 coun-
tries reformed their laws, policies and institutions during the 1990s (EIR, 
2003: 10). The EIR stresses that ‘in line with WBG advice’, these new leg-
islations, designed to ensure the protection of capital and to promote in-
vestment, successfully brought many developing countries to experience 
an investment boom in their mining, oil, and gas sectors (2003: 13). It is 
noted that exploration investment in Africa, which stood at 4 percent of 
worldwide exploration expenditure in 1991, rose to 17.5 percent in 1998, 
while mineral exploration and mine development investment in the conti-
nent doubled between 1990 and 1997 (EIR, 2003: 13). 
However, the consecutive waves of reforms promoted by the World 
Bank in the mining sector of poor and indebted countries over the last dec-
ades, have significantly transformed the power dynamics between the dif-
ferent stakeholders involved and affected by the mining industry. Key to 
this contribution is the work of Campbell (2004, 2009) who demonstrates 
that while the reform of regulatory and legal frameworks in the mining 
sector in Africa has indeed contributed to a more favourable environment 
for FDI, the reform has also entailed: ‘a process of redefining the role of 
the state that is so profound that it has no historical precedent’ (2004: 7). 
Because of this, further argues the author: ‘these measures have the po-
tential effect in the countries concerned of driving down norms and stand-
ards in areas of critical importance to social and economic development, as 
well as the protection of the environment’ (Campbell, 2004: 7). Such shifts 
are analysed in the following section in light of the rise of the social-devel-
opment narrative.
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b) New Mining Regimes and the Social-Development Agenda
While remaining resolutely focussed on the promotion of FDI, the Third 
Generation of mining codes（22）21, as further coined by Campbell (2004), 
dedicates more attention to the social and environmental dimensions of 
mining activities. Such shift that took place in recent years represents an 
acknowledgment of the role that remains to be played by the state in 
terms of facilitation and regulation of the sector. The Bank observes: ‘We 
have seen fundamental changes in the activities of governments from 
owner/operator of mining assets to a role of regulator/administrator while 
the private sector has moved from a position as a bystander to the driving 
force in mining investment and development’ (World Bank, 2007). Howev-
er, it is not the retreat of the state that the Bank is reaching for, but rather 
to transformation of the state’s functions in a way that accentuates its 
ability to mediate, regulate and mobilise in favour of the private sector 
rather than its citizens. 
It is within such a framework for the mining sector that the rise of the 
social-development narrative should be analysed. After decades of empha-
sis on deregulation, the Bank came to acknowledge that some form of reg-
ulation was required, notably in the social and environmental sectors. 
However, and this is the crucial idea underlying the social-development 
narrative, such social and environmental provisions are embedded in a 
framework which serves to mediate the risks facing investors above all 
else. In an analysis of the conceptualisation of the notion of ‘risk’ in the 
mining sector, Emel and Huber make a compelling argument by question-
ing how capital has come to claim a monopoly over the idea of risk (2008: 
1397): 
Largely ignored in the financial risk lexicon are the environmental, 
economic, social and public health risks to the landowner whether it 
be the host state or the local community. These latter risks – recog-
nized as significant by local community members, indigenous groups, 
and non-governmental organizations that resist mines – are viewed 
by investors, banks, and mining companies as engineering and social 
 21)  See Hatcher (2004) for an analysis of the Malian mining sector, which is a compelling illus-
tration of a third generation mining code.
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issues that can be mitigated. The host government is pressured with 
discouraging significant attention to these risks because they do 
heighten ‘political risk’ and thus their recognition will make the possi-
bility of capital investment all the more precarious (Emel and Huber, 
2008: 1398).
The recent imperative for the participation of local populations, as well as 
the new social and environmental provisions conveyed by the WBG’s so-
cial-development narrative does not therefore translate a novel interest in 
the political empowerment of local entities. It rather encompasses a need 
to rally certain segments of civil society to manage local resistance and to 
reduce risk to the Industry. MIGA observes that:
[…] well-designed environmental and social programs can help man-
age potential reputational risks for project sponsors, reduce social con-
flicts within communities, protect the environment and help reduce 
political risks. For these reasons, MIGA aims to help its clients take a 
responsible approach to the environmental and social aspects of their 
projects (Emphasis added. MIGA, 2009c: 1).
If corporate social responsibility is officially about ethics, it is in practice 
about risk management on the ground. In this light, the participatory 
schemes offered to local communities serve to inject legitimacy to the In-
dustry while channelling and neutralising the possible voices of contesta-
tion that might arise. While framed within a poverty reduction narrative, 
the politically sensitive questions linked to corporate profit, social and en-
vironmental risks, and the very role of the state are conveniently set aside. 
The political dimensions of the mining regimes promoted by the Bank 
over the last decades – which encompass recommendations notably on the 
rule of law, property rights, low taxation, low levels of tariffs and import 
barriers – have indeed been presented as ‘technical’ matters of efficiency 
and thus set outside the reach of public debates. As summarised by Camp-
bell: 
An overriding emphasis on internal processes characterised by a lack 
of transparency, coupled with essentially administrative approaches 
to reform in favour of greater transparency and accountability, if tak-
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en alone, run the danger of treating the symptoms of a particular ‘pol-
itics of mining’ and not the relations of influence and power which 
make such dysfunctional processes possible (Campbell, 2009: 3). 
While the WBG frames all its activities under the umbrella of poverty re-
duction, the social, economic and environmental impacts of mining on local 
communities are addressed within a technical framework which purposely 
sets aside the very political nature of the mining regime that it has been 
promoting. In other words, while enticing legal and economic provisions 
are being offered to mining companies to ‘compensate’ their risk for invest-
ing in reforming countries, the state has delegated its role as regulator to 
the private sector. As argued by Szablowski (2007) the legal and practical 
conditions required to attract FDI have circumscribed the nation state’s 
ability to respond to internal political pressures. As such, observes the au-
thor, coping strategies in order to reconcile competing internal and exter-
nal pressures have led the state to formally award rights to the investor, 
while informally delegating local regulatory responsibilities: ‘Accordingly, 
it appears that states themselves are involved in transferring legal au-
thority to mineral enterprises to manage social mediation’ (Szablowski, 
2007: 27). The Bank observes:
[…] the ‘shrinking state’ has meant new responsibilities for private 
mining companies. Other private sector actors have also taken promi-
nent positions; that is, the community members and representatives, 
including NGOs. In the area of environmental and social responsive-
ness, the industry has moved from a phase of awakening and accept-
ance to full integration of environmental considerations in project 
preparation and operations (World Bank, 2007).
There is a tendency to frames the socio-environmental issues linked to 
mining activities in terms of ‘externalities’, rather than ‘risks’ posed to lo-
cal communities. It conveniently allows for such concerns to be addressed, 
and indeed overcome, by multiplying ‘technical’ initiatives focused notably 
on capacity building. As such, the Bank suggests that the ‘adverse conse-
quences’ of mining activities on local communities could be better ad-
dressed notably if the local people had ‘the requisite skills to take advan-
tage of the opportunities’ (World Bank, 2005: 6). Hence, in recent years the 
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WBG has multiplied its technical initiatives to enhance local capacity, as 
well as to persuade the Industry to strengthen their standards and their 
community programmes such as school and health care provisions. 
As noted earlier, IFC and MIGA’s framework in addressing poverty 
builds on the potential of FDI such as building roads, providing clean wa-
ter and electricity, and above all, providing jobs. The EIR however, found 
that ‘the poorest do not benefit from extractive industries’ and that invest-
ments that did make contributions to poverty alleviation and capacity 
building through infrastructure (such as electrification or potable water 
systems) ‘do not benefit the poorest because tariffs are out of reach or dis-
tribution systems are not egalitarian’ (EIR, 2003: 18). The extractive sec-
tor is an enclave industry which benefits to the local economy remains 
highly questionable. As such, while IFC claims that its clients provided 
120,000 jobs in oil, gas, mining, and chemicals in 2007 (2008: 47), compel-
ling analyses have rather shown that large-scale mining, while capital-in-
tensive, does not actually create many long-term job opportunities (Camp-
bell, 2004, 2009; BIC et al., 2006). It is illustrative to note that while the 
IFC-financed Ahafo mine in Ghana, created 3,300 temporary jobs during 
construction, the mine would ultimately provided 620 permanent jobs 
(IFC, reported in BIC et al., 2006: 6). Amongst the roots of such disparities 
is the fact that the important technological requirements of the mining in-
dustry necessitate expatriates to be hired for the technical positions. In 
addition to sometimes requiring a displacement of population away from 
their livelihood, a new mine may also bar local communities from access-
ing an artisanal mine site and thus deprive them of their livelihood. In 
terms of local economic benefits, an international NGO coalition study of 
the WBG’s activities in gold mining concluded that since governments 
have been brought to remove the legal requirements for investors to hire 
or buy a certain portion of their supplies locally, there are no guarantees 
that local businesses would profit from a mine (BIC et al., 2006). 
Meanwhile however, the Industry has highly benefited from the re-
form of the mining sector over the last decade. Emel and Huber observe 
that in 2005, the government of Tanzania received approximately 
$30,000,000 in royalties and corporate income taxes while the mining 
companies produced $640,000,000 worth of gold (2008). The authors state 
that: ‘Even if production costs are one-half of the total value (a huge over-
estimation) the profits are 10 times what the rents are’ (Emel and Huber, 
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2008: 1403). What is further compelling is that despite such profit mar-
gins, companies benefit from additional ‘risk’ protection, notably from 
MIGA. An Operations Evaluation Group report found that while invest-
ments in the mining sector were indeed riskier than in other sectors, suc-
cessful investments were more likely to result in large returns (OEG, 
2005: 115). Beyond this ‘handful of very big winners’ in IFC’s portfolio, it is 
to be noted that an OEG evaluation found that four out of ten projects 
that were not successful for investors still had adequate economic rates of 
return (greater than 10 percent) (2005: 115).
One may argue that such emphasis on risk for investors is rather tell-
ing of the WBG’s inherently political strategy in the mining sector of re-
forming countries. Such strategy appears to be highly beneficial to the In-
dustry while the economic benefits, notably at the local levels, are falling 
short of the riches promised by the Group. Meanwhile, despite the social-
development narrative, the social and environmental costs faced by local 
communities remain severe. What is crucial to note is that however entic-
ing for ‘risk’ investors, the particular policy framework promoted by the 
Bank has restricted reforming states in their ability to explore alternate 
strategies for maximising the potential economic returns of the sector. Key 
alternative initiatives, such as the local transformation of mineral materi-
al, have indeed been discouraged22).
c) Complimentary Roles or Conflicting Interests?
Beyond the debatable strategy of pursuing pro-poor growth via a nar-
row focus on FDI, there exists a degree of contradiction between the pur-
suit of poverty reduction and the for-profit endeavours of MIGA and IFC, 
notably in light of the Bank’s parallel work on mining regimes. As a direct 
result of the profound transformation of the mining environment promot-
ed by the World Bank, the portfolio of MIGA and IFC in the sector greatly 
benefited. The ‘complimentary’ roles assumed by IFC, MIGA and the Bank 
itself bring forth a certain degree of controversy in relation to the conflict 
of interests that may ultimately exist between the different organisations. 
In other words, beyond the ongoing debate over the merits of the funda-
 22)  Alternative schemes to heighten the contribution of the mining sector to local and national 
economies throughout the last decades have often been derailed. On the subject, see for ex-
ample Campbell who maps the repeated attempts of Guinea to transform locally its lead-
ing raw material (2009).
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mentals promoted by the Bank in country-clients to tackle poverty, the is-
sue of IFC and MIGA directly benefiting from the policies promoted by 
their parent organisation remains. On the one hand, the Bank has had 
tremendous influence in transforming the economic climate of reforming 
countries in order to attract FDI while on the other hand, it’s affiliates 
have been directly investing and insuring in the private sector of these 
countries. However, there exists a certain contradiction between the pur-
suits of poverty reduction as stipulated by the Bank, and directly invest-
ing or insuring mining companies which unequivocally seek profits. Inter-
national NGO coalitions have questioned the merits of investing 
taxpayers’ money and scarce foreign aid dollars into companies such as 
Domino’s Pizza, Coca-cola, or Radisson and Marriot luxury hotels, which 
are all IFC or MIGA’s clients (Guttal, 2007; BIC, 2009).
The increasing coordinating mechanisms, notably between the Bank 
and IFC, raise concerns about the dual agendas of the pursuit of profit and 
the pursuit of poverty reduction, environmental protection and social safe-
guards. While the new IDA/IFC Secretariat is said to translate IFC’s 
‘growing awareness of the role the private sector plays in helping the poor-
est countries reduce poverty and improve people’s lives’ (IFC, 2008: 24), se-
rious doubts persist in relation to the degree of attention the poverty re-
duction agenda will be assigned in relation to the quest for profit. Bray 
underlines that ultimately, the role of business is to create prosperity and 
that this limits its willingness to address broader social problems, particu-
larly those brought on by conflict (2003: 297).
Moreover, there ultimately exists some degree of concern as the fun-
damental role played by public organisations in not only investing directly 
in for-profit projects, but in highly sensitive environment as well. In light 
of the clear conclusions of the EIR that IFC and MIGA should refrain from 
investing in mining projects of conflict-affected countries (EIR, 2003: 47), 
it is crucial to question the catalytic role of IFC and MIGA in specifically 
risky environment. This substantial influence of MIGA and IFC in the 
mining sector is closely linked to the fact that they are integral parts of 
the WBG. As such, both affiliates draw on the significant economic and po-
litical weight wielded by the multilateral organisation. IFC and MIGA’s 
clients benefit from the leverage their multilateral partners are bringing 
to projects in difficult or frontier markets: ‘Governments have a vested in-
terest in the sustainability of investments covered by MIGA’ (MIGA, 
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2009c: 4). As further summarised by MIGA:
As part of the World Bank Group, and having as our shareholders 
both host countries and investor countries, MIGA brings security and 
credibility to an investment that is unmatched. Our presence in a po-
tential investment can literally transform a ‘no-go’ into a ‘go.’ We act 
as a potent deterrent against government actions that may adversely 
affect investments. And even if disputes do arise, our leverage with 
host governments frequently enables us to resolve differences to the 
mutual satisfaction of all parties (MIGA, 2009a).
In a World Bank contribution on Natural Resources and Violent Conflict, 
Bray conveys that although working with MIGA is more complicated and 
time-consuming than working with the private sector, companies value 
MIGA’s involvement ‘because of the extra political weight carried by the 
World Bank Group’ (2003: 324). Bray further observes that: ‘It is under-
stood that host countries are reluctant to antagonize the World Bank by 
threatening MIGA-sponsored projects, and, throughout the organization’s 
history, there has been only one claim’ (Bray, 2003: 324). After all, since its 
inception, MIGA only paid a claim once – a derisory 15 million to Enron in 
200023).
CONCLUSION
Amidst the current challenges to meet the Millennium Development Goals, 
there has been great emphasis in recent years on the urgency to better un-
derstand the correlation between mining activities and pro-poor economic 
growth. While different stakeholders have been multiplying technical ini-
tiatives in order to mitigate the social and environmental costs of mining 
activities, notably on local communities, less attention has been given to 
the particular impact of the coordinated role of the members of the WBG 
in specifically enticing ‘risk’ investments in reforming countries. It ap-
pears that the conceptualisation of risk has been overwhelmingly dedicat-
ed to the multiple threats that investors have to confront in investing in 
such sector. Far less attention has been given to the contradictions inher-
 23) On the subject, as well as other case studies of MIGA, see Moody (2005).
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ent to WBG’s strategy, which correlates the pursuit of FDI in a sector that 
has been widely acknowledged to be environmentally and socially conten-
tious, with poverty reduction. 
While the shift towards a social-development narrative by the WBG 
has marked the instigation of stricter policy and safeguards in the sector, 
it was observed that they fall short of mitigating the environmental, social 
and human rights issues inherent to the sector. It was rather argued that 
the social-development narrative is better understood in light of the new 
mining regimes that have been pushed forward by the Bank in the last 
decade. Such regimes have severely transformed the power dynamics be-
tween the different stakeholders involved in the mining industry. As a re-
sult of the dual tensions caused by the pressures to deregulate the mining 
sector on the one hand, and on the other hand, the rise of contestation 
against the social and environmental costs of mining activities, reforming 
states have been increasingly delegating some of their authority into the 
hands of the Industry. The social-development narrative therefore, encom-
passes a pale attempt by the WBG and the Industry to manage the social 
tensions inherent to mining activities. 
Ultimately, the WBG’s strategy in relation to the mining sector brings 
forth serious concerns in relation to the conflict of interest that lies within 
the Group. While the Bank has been highly successful in enticing mining 
regimes reform and thus multiplying investments in the sector, IFC and 
MIGA have been partnering with the private sector and amassing profits. 
The WBG however, remains a public institution with a stated objective of 
freeing the world of poverty. As such, it was argued that there exists a pro-
found contradiction between the Bank’s pursuits of poverty reduction on 
the one hand, and on the other, IFC and MIGA’s pursuit of profit via the 
promotion of risk investments.
At a time when MIGA and IFC are distinctly multiplying their efforts 
towards fragile states, notably post-conflict states, such conclusions fur-
ther raise a particular set of interrogations as the Extractive Industries 
Review unequivocally concluded that: ‘Under no circumstances should IFC 
and MIGA support oil, gas, and mining projects in areas involved in or at 
high risk of armed conflict’ (EIR, 2003: 47).
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